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* Background
The entire decade of 1990s was full of discussion on the positive and negative impacts of financial sector reforms and their implications for the agricultural sector. In the era of financial sector reforms, sustainability, viability and operational efficiency of RFIs are the major issues that need to be taken cognisance of in ensuring effective rural credit delivery system. However, the major problems plaguing the efficiency of rural credit delivery system are the mounting overdue 1 and Non Performing Assets (NPAs) 2 of RFIs. The overdue problem of different entities of rural credit delivery structure is reported to be an all pervasive phenomenon that cuts across these different agencies (Puhazhendi and Jayaraman, 1999) . As per the estimates reported by Gulati and Bathla (2002) , not only the outstanding loans of various RFIs operating in India grew significantly but the overdue of these financial institutions had increased considerably during the period between 1980 and 1998. The RRBs, in particular, showed maximum increase in their outstanding loans, followed by CBs. The primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) and LDBs in comparison showed the lowest increase in their outstanding loans.
Among various states of India, the RFIs of Maharashtra are reported to show the highest amount of overdues and outstanding loans over the past one decade (Gulati and Bathla, 2002) . Even the proportion of overdues to outstanding loan of RFIs are substantially high in this state. One can observe several weaknesses insofar as the working of RFIs in Maharashtra is concerned. One of the earlier studies conducted in cooperative sector of Maharashtra has clearly shown better financial health for the institutions at the district level as compared to the primary or grass root level (Shah, 2001) . It is not the cooperatives alone but there are several rural financial institutions that are beset with similar plethora of deficiencies that impede their efficient functioning. This necessitates a relook at the performance of various agricultural financial institutions operating in Maharashtra with a view to recommending, designing and framing appropriate policies to rejuvenate the existing rural credit delivery in this state.
Focus
The major foci of attention of this paper are on not only to review the rural credit scenario of Maharashtra but also to examine the banking business, in general, and disparity in distribution of credit, in particular, in both forward and backward regions/districts of Maharashtra. 3 The scope of the study stretches further to the evaluation of issues related to viability of these agricultural financial institutions operating in these regions/districts of the state, especially in the era of financial sector reforms.
The entire paper is divided into two sections. While the first section brings into focus the functioning of various agricultural financial institutions in Maharashtra with an emphasis on credit cooperatives, commercial banks, regional rural banks (RRBs) and land development banks (LDBs), the second section is chiefly devoted to the evaluation of credit delivery in forward and backward regions/districts of Maharashtra, aside from assessing the viability of credit institutions in these regions of the state.
Section I Rural Credit Scenario of Maharashtra
In fact, in the state of Maharashtra, the diversification of agriculture over the years has accentuated the need for the rapid development of rural infrastructure and a larger flow of credit. Various credit cooperatives, commercial banks and RRBs are by far the major financial institutions engaged in meeting the capital requirements for diversified activities and developing the farming/rural sector of the state. Besides, LDBs are also playing a crucial role in meeting the increasing capital needs of the farmers of this state. Although there has been multi-agency set-up for rural banking, the major institutional finance to farming community in Maharashtra comes from commercial banks and credit cooperatives.
Cooperative Bank Finances
Two types of set-up, viz. one short term and the other medium term, constitute the credit cooperative structure in Maharashtra. A 3-tier system is central to the structure of both the short term and the medium term credit cooperatives. This 3-tire system consists of a Cooperative apex bank at the state level, Central Co-operative banks at the district level and of Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies (PACS) at the village level. The three tier set-up is not only meeting the credit requirements of the farmers for seasonal agricultural operations (crop loans) but also investing on farm assets that do not entail huge capital outlay.
Although there has been substantial increase in the membership of credit cooperatives in the state of Maharashtra, the trend over the last two decades in terms of cooperative finances is not very encouraging in this state, especially in more recent times.
The trend over the past two decades show a slower growth in institutional finance through credit cooperatives during the decade of economic reforms (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) as against the decade preceding it (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . Not only this, the reform period is also seen to be marked with a slower growth in membership of credit cooperatives in Maharashtra (Table 1) . On the other hand, the outstanding loans of these cooperatives have grown at much faster rate as compared to their loan advances during both pre-and post economic reform periods. TE 1982/83  31  18565  18596  1109  5595  6704  3318  288  3606  1507  431  1938  TE 1990/91  34  19694  19728  1523  7910  9433  9298  929  10227  4811  1521  6332  TE 1999/00  34  20378  20412  1340 10432 11772  22195 2280  24475  15274  3456 2) All growth rates significant at 1 per cent level of probability 3) NS: Growth rates not significant at 1 per cent level of probability 4) Apex institutions include SCBs and DCCBs
Another interesting feature of credit cooperatives, particularly of PACS in Maharashtra, is the increasing trend in their share of medium and long term (MT &LT) advances and decline in their share of short term (ST) advances (Table 2 ). The trends in recovery and outstanding loans of PACS in Maharashtra are also similar to that of their loan advances, i.e., a declining share in short term recovery and outstanding loans of PACS in the face of an increasing trend in their share of MT and LT recovery and outstanding loans during the period between TE 1985 and TE 2000. This is a pointer to the fact that in more recent times medium and long term loans have become the major foci of farm finance. Nonetheless, mention may be made here that the PACS in Maharashtra are beset with several deficiencies in their functioning. The deficiencies are noticed in respect of their law operational efficiency, high incidence of overdue, low level of recovery, distributional aspect of ST and MT loans, coverage of SC/ST members, etc. (Shah, 2001) . The borrowing members per society of PACS are also reported to have come down, especially after the late eighties period. Further, despite Maharashtra being accounting for the bulk of the nation's total production and acreage under cotton crop, the share of this crop in total crop loan advances of PACS is also reported to have declined perceptibly, especially in more recent times (Shah, 2001) . Even the statistics reported by Mujumdar (2001) at all-India level show a decline in borrowing farmers during the period between 1990-91 and 1995-96.
However, this statistics is reported for commercial banks. In fact, the lackadaisical approach of PACS towards loan advances to SC/ST members and other weaker sections, and also for cotton crop calls for immediate remedial measures if Maharashtra is to continue to lead the country in the cooperative development.
Commercial Bank Finances
Despite several targets prescribed by the RBI for Public Sector Banks (PSBs) 4 , these banks are reported to have defaulted on majority of these targets (Mujumdar, 2001) . This is evident from the fact that, during the period between 1992 and 1996, the net bank credit of PSBs to priority sectors at all-India level was well below 40 per cent. Not only this, at allIndia level, the net bank credit of PSBs to agriculture and to weaker sections remained well below 18 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, of their total advances all through the period between 1991 and 2000. This is a reflection of the fact that the two sub-targets of credit to agriculture and to weaker sections continue to remain unattained even in more recent times.
As for institutional finance to farming community, the commercial banks in Maharashtra have also not shown encouraging trends. The trend over the past two decades shows a slower growth in rural institutional finance through commercial banks during the decade of economic reforms as against the pre-economic reform period (Table 3 ). The commercial banks in Maharashtra have not only shown slower growth in their loan advances and deposits but also decline in their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio during the period of reforms as against the pre-economic reform period. However, mention may be made here that though the rural C-D ratio of commercial banks in Maharashtra has come down from 72 per cent during TE 1982/83 to 65 per cent by the TE 1999/00, it is still well above the minimum prescribed limit of 60 per cent as stipulated by the RBI. Table 4 also shows an increasing trend in share of Maharashtra in total outstanding loans of all scheduled commercial banks of India, which has grown from 10 per cent during TE 1985 to as high as above 14 per cent by the TE 2000. These trends are certainly not very encouraging insofar as the commercial bank finances to farming community in Maharashtra are concerned. Despite the recommendations of the R.V. Gupta Committee, appointed in 1997, which encompass several changes in commercial bank's documentation, loan appraisal parameters, operational procedures and loan product with built-in liquid saving product, the rural credit delivery through commercial banks in Maharashtra has grown at lower pace, especially during the 1990s.
Regional Rural Bank Finances
It is to be noted that considering the dismal performance of RRBs and their weak structure, Government of India (GOI) unleashed in the first phase its financial sector reforms in 1994-95 and embarked upon an ambitious plan of revamping initially 49 out of a total of 196 RRBs with the aim of improving their profitability besides launching several other policy reforms aimed at improving their functional efficiency. In the second phase, based on the recommendations of Basu Committee, another batch of 68 RRBs were brought under restructuring during 1995-96. As a result of these revamping efforts, 40 RRBs were reported to have shown profits (Capoor, 1998) . Although various policies relating to restructuring and revamping of RRBs were introduced in the first and second phase of financial sector reforms, the policy relating to granting of permission by the RBI to RRBs to invest in non-target avenues like shares and debentures of corporates, units of mutual funds, bonds of public sector undertakings, etc. was severely criticized by Mujumdar (2001) as this had paved the way for a reverse flow of funds from the rural to the urban sector.
Undoubtedly, the major part of resources of RRBs is generated through deposits.
Nonetheless, too much dependence on deposits and lack of attention paid to loan advances is RRBs from the objectives they were initially formed. It has been asserted by Shivamaggi (2000) that the major problem faced by RRBs in India is the lack of staff motivation and specialization despite local recruitment of their staff.
The poor performance of RRBs greatly owed it to their hurriedly recruited and trained staff that not only lack exposure in dealing with a large number of small-term/ composite loans but also in terms their weak knowledge to deal with bank accounts, seek assistance and guidance at each stage of loan application to its recovery.
Land Development Bank Finances
The flow of finances through LDBs encompass activities relating to agricultural production sub-system (APS), agricultural input distribution sub-system (AIS), agricultural produce marketing and processing sub-system (AMPS), and also long-term finance to members of LDBs for the purpose of purchase of tractor and its accessories, minor irrigation, milch and draught animal purchase, etc. The loans to members of LDBs for long term purposes are provided against the mortgage of their lands. Although the overall performance of LDBs in India is satisfactory, they still have to do a lot of catching up to improve the condition of rural India. The major problem crippling the functioning of LDBs is the mounting amount of overdues and their outstanding loans, which have grown dramatically.
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In the state of Maharashtra, the loan advances of LDBs have not only declined sharply during the period of reform but also working capital of these banks fell marginally during this period (Table 6) (Table 6 ). In order to tackle the problem of overdue of LDBs, certain suggestions have been extended by Kumar and Dixit (1998) , which mainly revolve around creation of greater coordination among ST, MT and LT loans and streamlining the operations of LDBs, checking the diversion and misuse of LDB's credit, effective supervision of loan product, strengthening the share capital base, and mobilizing deposits and debentures through more innovative deposits and debenture schemes. Another important suggestion in this context is in favour of launching intensive membership drive with a view to increase the coverage of these long term financial institutions. Some of the agricultural and rural development banks (ARDBs), popularly known as LDBs, have already taken initiatives in these directions.
Micro Credit Innovations
In the midst of apparent inadequacies of formal financial institutions and their failure to serve and protect the interest of rural poor despite their phenomenal outreach, an informal segment comprising of small groups of rural poor began to mobilize capital and savings of their members and used these resources among their members on a micro scale. These groups were termed as Self Help Groups (SHGs). The lending procedures of these groups were not only simple but also effective due to small amount of loans involved in the process. Since the Table 7 . In the state of Maharashtra, the number of SHGs linked with bank credit have grown significantly over the past five years. This could be witnessed from As per the speech of the Hon'ble Union Minister of Finance, about 1,00,000 SHGs were targeted to be promoted in India during the year 2000-01 (NABARD Annual Report, 2000-01). In view of this target, the NABARD had set its mission to link a minimum of 5,000
SHGs with bank credit in the state of Maharashtra during the year 2000-01. The NABARD has also drawn a medium-term strategic plan to ensure linkage of at least 55,000 SHGs with bank credit by the end of 2004. In order to accelerate the pace of SHG-Bank linkage programme, the NABARD has also devised district-specific and location-specific strategies in view of available potential, resources and prevailing constraints. It is expected that with the increasing involvement of banking system as well as NGOs the micro-credit movement will get further fillip in the years to come.
Section II
The present study not only evaluates, in general, the functioning of various RFIs in Maharashtra but also attempts to assess the banking business and viability of these credit institutions in forward and backward regions of the state. However, insofar as the functioning RFIs in these two distinct regions is concerned, the confine of the study is only to two districts of the state. Since the district of Sangli showed the highest composite score on the scale developed for forward districts, this district was selected for the present investigation as a forward district. Similarly, the district of Buldana was selected as backward district as it showed one of the lowest scores on the scale developed for backward districts.
Banking Business in Forward and Backward Districts
The As for the backward district of Buldana, the banking network encompasses a group of four public sector banks, two banks relating to State Bank group, two cooperative banks, two Gramin banks, and M.S.F.C. However, in general, these banks are broadly classified as commercial and cooperative banks.
In general, the development of banking business in Sangli and Buldana districts has been evaluated in terms of growth trends in credit in relation to deposits and also in terms of targets achieved by various banks under DCP during the period between 1989-90 and 1998-99, and these estimates for commercial and cooperative banks, are brought out in Table 9 .
A critical evaluation of Table 9 shows dwindling of credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks in the forward district of Sangli , which has fallen even below 60 per cent It is also clearly evident from Table 9 that, during the period between 1990-91 and 1996-97, the commercial banks operating in Sangli district have not only achieved their targets of loan advances set for agriculture and allied activities but also for other priority sectors. Similarly, the cooperative banks operating in this district are also seen to achieve their targets of loan advances set for agriculture and allied. However, the performance of commercial banks in terms of achieving their targets of loan advances to various sectors is much better as compared to cooperative banks operating in this district. Interestingly, neither the commercial nor the cooperative banks have achieved the targets of loan advances set for S.S.Is, especially during 1995-96 and 1996-97. As a result, the overall targets of loan advances achieved by commercial and cooperative banks have fallen close to 100 per cent during these years. As for the achievement of targets of loan advances under DCP, both commercial and cooperative banks, in general, are seen to show better performance during the period between 1990-91 and 1994-95 and thereafter a deterioration in their performance in this respect is seen.
An analysis drawn from Table 9 It is to be further noted that the loan advances of commercial banks to priority sectors in Sangli district remained well above 40 per cent of their total loan advances during the period between 1991-92 and 1996-97 (Table 10) . Similarly, during the same period, the direct advances of commercial banks to agriculture also remained above 18 per cent of their total loan advances as stipulated by the RBI. Except for the year 1996-97, the advances of commercial banks to weaker sections also remained above 10 per cent as stipulated by the RBI. Nonetheless, the disquieting feature of Table 10 is the loan advances of commercial banks under DRI schemes, which is seen to have remained less than 1 per cent of their total loan advances all through the period between 1991-92 and 1996-97. On the hand, the cooperative banks in this district have shown relatively better performance insofar as their loan advances to priority sectors, direct loan advances to agriculture, and loan advances to weaker sections are concerned. Source: As in Table 9 . Notes: 1) PS = Priority Sector; DA = Direct Agriculture; WS = Weaker Sections DRI = Differential Rate of Interest Schemes; NPS = Non Priority Sector 2) RBI has stipulated minimum levels as follows: (i) Advances to priority sector -40 % of total advances, (ii) Advances to agriculture -18 % of total advances, (iii) Advances to weaker sections -10 % of total advances, (iv) Advances under DRI schemes -1 % per cent of total advances, and (v) Credit/Deposit ratio -a minimum of 60 %.
The cooperative banks operating in this district have strictly followed the minimum prescribed limits of the RBI. Table 10 also shows a steady increase in loan advances of commercial banks to non priority sectors. Contrary to this, the loan advances of cooperative banks to these sectors have come down in course of time.
Thus, the estimates relating to banking business presented in Tables 9 and 10 This holds good in both the forward district of Sangli and the backward district of Buldana.
Shrinking flow of credit to S.S.Is during the decade of 1990s is certainly a matter of concern.
Disparities in Crop Loan Advances
Among various types of loans extended by PACS, short-term crop loan is by far the most important one as farmers crop activity largely depends on it. In fact, these kinds of loans are provided to the farmers for the purchase of various inputs like seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. and also for meeting expenses of labour, irrigation, etc. These loans have direct bearing on crop production and they are extended on the basis of acreage and cost of cultivation of the crops grown, subject to the repayment capacity of the farmers. It is, therefore, essential to evaluate the distribution pattern of these loans in the selected forward and backward districts. Table 11 . Buldana. This will certainly help the farmers not only to increase their crop production but also in terms of achieving sustained growth of agricultural sector of this district.
Viability of Credit Institutions
The withdrawal of Government regulations has helped many states, especially in terms of expansion and development of their credit related activities. The state of Maharashtra is no exception to this phenomenon. In this state, there has been considerable growth in the facilities extended by the three tiers of organisational structure of credit cooperatives, especially after the early nineties period. Of the three tiers, the district level institution can be viewed as the most active unit because it is this unit which provides the physical infrastructure needed for credit, input, training and service facilities. It can be reckoned as the kingpin of the entire business. However, the question that merits attention is how far the district level institution will be successful and how best they will be managed under the relaxed market conditions. Although in the past various research workers have carried out various studies with varying spectrum of issues, the studies related to economic viability of district level institution are not very many, especially under the free market environment. It is, therefore, imperative to study and evaluate the financial health and economic viability of these district level units under more liberalised regime of market environment and assess what changes are most discernable as far as their functioning and management are concerned.
The focus of the present study is on assessing viability of only central level credit institutions operating in both forward district of Sangli and backward district of Buldana.
These central level credit institutions are: Sangli District Central Cooperative Bank (SDCCB)
and Buldana District Central Cooperative Bank (BDCCB). The viability of these credit institutions is evaluated with the help of estimation of break-even levels of their total loan advances and deposits, and also through estimation of various financial ratios, particularly for the period between 1984-85 and 1998-99.
Break-even Analysis of Advances and Deposits
The estimates on the variable cost incurred and income generated in respect of per hundred rupee of money spent on advances coupled with break-even points of loan advances and deposits for SDCCB and BDCCB encompassing the period between 1984-85 and 198-99 are provided in Table 12 .
The estimates provided in Table 12 show that the SDCCB granted 12.62 per cent higher loan than the break-even level during TE 1986-87, 26.59 per cent during TE 1992-93, and 5.88 per cent during TE 1998-99. A similar trend was also noticed in respect of breakeven level of deposits and actual deposit of the bank. The actual deposit of SDCCB turned out to be 23.38 per cent higher than the estimated break-even level during TE 1986-87, 26.66 per cent during TE 1992-93 and 5.94 per cent during TE 1998-99. Thus, the financial viability of SDCCB had declined during TE 1998-99 as against TE 1986-87 and TE 1992-93 consequent to break-even levels of both advances and deposits becoming very close to actual advances and deposits during the late nineties as compared to mid-eighties and the early nineties. TE 1986 -87, Rs.5344.31 lakhs in TE 1992 -93, and Rs.15716.78 lakhs in TE 1998 . Thus, the bank granted 8.94 per cent higher loan than the break-even level during TE 1986 -87 and 4.68 per cent during TE 1992 -93. However, during TE 1998 , the actual loan advance of BDCCB was much lower than the breakeven level and a deficit in this loan to the tune of around 60 per cent was noticed during this period. A similar trend was also noticed in respect of break-even level of deposits and the actual deposit of the bank. The actual deposit of BDCCB turned out to be 9.27 per cent higher than the estimated break-even level during TE 1986-87 and 5.23 per cent during TE 199293 with a deficit in this deposit estimated at 60 per cent during TE 1998-99.
The foregoing observations are pointer to the fact that the financial viability of BDCCB had declined sharply during the late nineties period as against the mid-eighties and early nineties periods. The major reason for higher break-even levels of loan advances and deposits could be traced in excessively high fixed expenses incurred by BDCCB due to inclusion of high levels NPAs during the late nineties period.
Financial Ratio Analysis
Five different categories of ratios have been estimated with a view to analyse the operational and functional efficiency of SDCCB and BDCCB and these ratios for the three time periods under consideration are brought out in Table 13 .
A critical evaluation of Table 13 revealed that though the financial health of SDCCB had improved during the second half as against the former half of the overall period considered, the more recent period, i.e. the late nineties period, was found to be marked with declining profitability ratios, fixed ratio, asset turnover ratio, income-expenditure ratio, equalization and income multiplier, and marginal efficiency of capital of SDCCB. Although the capitalization ratio of SDCCB gave an indication that the permanent capital of this financial institution had increased over time, this increase in permanent capital of SDCCB, however, might not be considered as a sign of improvement in its efficiency since major portion of SDCCB's assets were financed by debt and this dependency on debt had marginally increased during the latter half as against the former half of the overall period.
Further, hardly any improvement in the net worth of SDCCB was observed and in fact the share of net worth in total liability of SDCCB had rather declined over time. The declining share of net worth was instrumental in causing an increase in debt asset ratio of SDCCB during the latter period. This apart, the return on owner's equity had also drastically fallen during the late nineties period as against the early nineties. Thus, it could be interpreted that the financial health and economic viability of SDCCB had considerably declined in more recent times, ignoring increasing trends in several financial ratios. In fact, the return on owner's equity is a function of how efficiently a firm manages its assets, the net profit margin on sales, and the degree of financial leverage. A decline in returns on equity of SDCCB could, therefore, be considered as a sign of decline in the efficiency of SDCCB in managing its assets and liabilities, and also income and expenditure pattern, especially in more recent times.
Insofar as the BDCCB is concerned, the mounting NPAs or overdue or bad debt during the late nineties period had adversely affected majority of the estimated ratios during this period. Not only the permanent capital position of BDCCB was noticed to weaken during the late nineties period but its dependency on debt for its finances had also sharply increased during this period. The share of net worth in total liability of BDCCB was also noticed to have sharply declined during the period between mid-eighties and the late nineties. The declining share of net worth had caused an increase in debt asset ratio of BDCCB during this period. Added to this, the return on equity of BDCCB had not only drastically fallen but it became negative during the late nineties period as against the mid-eighties or the early nineties period. The rate of return on asset and marginal efficiency of capital of BDCCB had also shown a drastic fall during the period between early-and the late nineties. All these disquieting trends clearly indicate non-viable functioning of BDCCB during the more recent times. Further, the negative value of return on equity of BDCCB noticed during the late nineties period clearly indicates inefficiency of BDCCB in managing its assets and liability, as also its income and expenditure patterns.
Conclusions
The slower growth in institutional finances through commercial banks, credit (Mujumdar, 2001) . One of the further disquieting features of RFIs in Maharashtra has been the incidence of high proportion of NPAs to total assets, particularly with respect to RRBs and SCARDBs, and it was estimated to hover around 36-48 per cent during the mid-to late nineties.
An analysis encompassing central level credit cooperatives operating in forward and backward districts of Maharashtra also revealed deterioration in their financial health due to mounting NPAs or overdues'. It is to be noted that both SDCCB and BDCCB showed a decline in their financial health and economic viability during the late nineties as against the early nineties period. Nonetheless, this deterioration in financial health witnessed particularly during the second half (between TE 1992-93 and TE 1998-99) of the overall period (TE 1986-87 and TE 1998-99 ) was found to be more pronounced in the case of BDCCB as not only various financial ratios estimated for this bank had declined during this period but majority of them were seen to be beset with negative values, especially during the late nineties period.
The mounting NPAs or overdues' of BDCCB, noticed during the late nineties period, had grossly affected the functioning of this bank. They had not only affected various estimated financial ratios but also break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of this bank. Because of substantially high NPAs, the fixed expenses of BDCCB had been adversely affected, which in turn had grossly affected the break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of this bank, so much so that there had been huge gap between the break-even levels of loan advances and deposits and the actual loan advances and deposits. The deficit between actual and the breakeven levels were so high (about 60 per cent) that it was well-nigh impossible for BDCCB to overcome this situation. The mounting NPAs of BDCCB had also affected the profit profile of this bank during the late nineties period. The proportions of actual advance and deposits to their break-even levels of SDCCB had also come down during the latter half (between TE 1992-93 and TE 1998-99) as against the former half (between TE 1986-87 and TE 1992-93) of the overall period considered. Nonetheless, mention may be made here that there was no deficit between actual and break-even levels of loan advances and deposits of SDCCB during this period. Thus, while BDCCB had shown gross inefficiency in its functioning during the latter half of the overall period, the SDCCB, on the other hand, showed only a general deterioration in its financial health during this period.
One of the reasons for such high incidence of NPAs of RFIs has been the familiar practice of debt forgiveness, which eroded repayment and allowed defaulters to go scot free with no deterrent reprimand. Political interference in issues of prudent fiscal management has got a lot to do with this unfortunate scenario. There is, therefore, a need to take more stringent and cohesive measures for recovery of loans from chronic and heavy defaulters. In brief, in order to rejuvenate rural credit delivery system, the twin problems facing the system, viz., high transaction costs and poor repayment performance, need to be tackled with more fiscal jurisprudence reserving exemplary punishment for willful defaults, especially by large farmers. In fact, insofar as the rural credit delivery system is concerned, the focus should be on strategies that are required for tackling issues such as sustainability and viability, operational efficiency, recovery performance, small farmer coverage and balanced sectoral development (Puhazhendhi and Jayaraman, 1999) .
Notes
1. Lack of recovery of loan results into overdues. Overdues are defined as loans and interest thereon not repaid on due dates. The financial health of banking business heavily depends on recovery of loans. Of the total amount of loan due at different points of time, some of it is recoverable and some irrecoverable and the latter often turns into bad debt or defaults (Gulati and Bathla, 2002) .
2. As per M. Narasimham (RBI 1991) Committee, the non performing assets (NPAs) are those loan advances which are marked with non payment of interest or repayment of principal or both for a period of two quarters or more during the year ending. An amount is considered as 'post due' if it is unpaid for 30 days beyond due date. The NPAs are broadly classified as sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets.
3. The forward and backward districts were identified through composite index method. The composite index was computed for each district and the parameters included in the construction of composite index were cropping intensity, irrigation intensity, operational holding, number of commercial banks, per capita bank credit to agriculture, per hectare bank credit to agriculture, outstanding agricultural finance, number of cooperative banks, membership of PACs, loan advances of PACs, and outstanding loans of PACs. Based on these indicators, the total composite score of each district was computed. The districts showing scores above 100 were treated as forward and districts showing scores below 100 were considered as backward. Thus, following this procedure the forward and backward districts of Maharashtra were separated. This procedure helped to develop a scale for ranking all the forward and backward districts of Maharashtra.
4. In terms of directed credit, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stipulated several targets for Public Sector Banks (PSBs). These encompass a minimum of: (a) 40 per cent of net bank credit to priority sectors, (b) 18 per cent of total advances to agriculture, (c) 10 per cent of total advances to weaker sections, (d) one per cent of net bank credit under differential rate of interest (DRI) scheme, and (e) maintenance of a 60 per cent of a credit-deposit ratio. Among these targets, (b) and (c) are the two sub targets of (a), i.e., 18 per cent of net bank credit to agriculture and 10 per cent to weaker sections with an overall 40 per cent of net bank credit to priority sectors.
5. The overdues of Primary Cooperative Agriculture Rural Development Banks (PCARDBs) at all-India level is reported to have grown from Rs.196.43 crores in 1987 to Rs.435.20 crores in 1995 (Kumar and Dixit, 1998 . Earlier, while reviewing the report of Agricultural Credit Review Committee, Shivamaggi (1996) had also cited overdue as the major problem facing the LDBs. This is despite the fact that the loans extended by LDBs not only help in creating productive assets but also in terms of generating adequate incremental income to the farmers.
6. The linkage between banks and SHGs is a mechanism for channeling credit to the poor on a sustained basis. There are numerous potential advantages involved in the linkages between banks and SHGs with NGOs acting as facilitators or financial intermediaries. From the banks point of view, the advantages of linkage approach between banks and SHGs include reduction in transaction cost, mobilization of small savings, assured and timely repayment of loan leading to faster recycling of funds, opportunity for expansion of business and coverage of poor clientele, and prospects of future quality clients. In this process, NGOs not only act as bridge between banks and the poor and perform their role as financial intermediaries in unbanked and backward areas but they are also propagators of innovative credit delivery approaches. The efforts of NGOs develop thrift habit among the poor and provide them access to large quantity of finance. The efforts of NGOs in linking banks with SHGs also provide freedom, equality, self-reliance and empowerment among the members, besides making them available consumption/ production credit at their door-steps. This in turn helps the members of SHGs to have a window for access to better technology and upgradation of their skills. The NGOs also help SHGs to have access to various promotional assistance, besides scaling up of their operations.
